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Background: In the Netherlands in 2006, a health insurance system reform took place in which regulated
competition between insurers and providers is key. In this context, the government placed greater emphasis on
patients being able to choose health insurers and providers as a precondition for competition. Patient choice
became an instrument instead of solely a goal in itself. In the current study, we investigated the concept of ‘patient
choice’ of healthcare providers, as postulated in the supporting documentation for this reform, because we wanted
to try to understand the assumptions policy makers had regarding patient choice of healthcare providers.
Methods: We searched policy documents for assumptions made by policy makers about patient choice of
healthcare providers that underlie the health insurance system reform. Additionally, we held interviews with people
who were involved in or closely followed the reform.
Results: Our study shows that the government paid much more attention to the instrumental goal of patient
choice. Patients are assumed to be able to choose a provider rationally if a number of conditions are satisfied, e.g.
the availability of enough comparative information. To help ensure those conditions were met, the Dutch
government and other parties implemented a variety of supporting instruments.
Conclusions: Various instruments have been put in place to ensure that patients can act as consumers on the
healthcare market. Much less attention has been paid to the willingness and ability of patients to choose, i.e. choice
as a value. There was also relatively little attention paid to the consequences on equity of outcomes if some patient
groups are less inclined or able to choose actively.
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In most northwest European countries, such as the
Netherlands, Scandinavia and the UK, actively choosing
a healthcare provider was traditionally not common. In
the Netherlands for instance, although patients have al-
ways had free choice of doctor, in practice general prac-
titioners long had fixed patient lists (linked to capitation* Correspondence: a.victoor@nivel.nl
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orpayments) and visits to a medical specialist were (and
still are) only possible after referral by a GP. However,
initiatives have been taken recently in all these countries
to extend patients’ ability to choose their provider, to en-
courage them to make an active choice and to support
them in the process of making their choice [1-7].
There are two main reasons why patient choice is
promoted [8]. Firstly, choice of provider gained im-
portance as something that patients value. Because
today’s patients are more demanding, they want a more
active role in their own healthcare [9-11]. NationalLtd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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legislation for patient rights that strengthens their role
or, in other words, empowers them. Giving patients the
right and possibility to choose is one aspect of patient
empowerment [8,9,11]. It gives patients a strong instru-
ment to influence their healthcare [11,12].
Secondly, engaging patients in their own healthcare is
also seen as the best way to ensure sustainability of
health systems, to promote quality improvement and to
shorten waiting times [2,8,11]. This is the instrumental
use of patient choice. Patients were expected to ‘vote
with their feet’ [13] by choosing only those healthcare
providers that offer the best care, based on the compara-
tive information available on quality and costs. This se-
lection prompts providers to compete for patients by
improving the care they deliver, because, when the care
they deliver is not optimal, patients may ‘punish’ them
by going elsewhere (exit) [8,12,14-16].
In the Netherlands, encouraging patient choice also
has multiple goals [8]. In the 1970s, the Dutch govern-
ment set itself the aims of explicitly developing policy on
patients and legislation for patients’ rights as part of the
emancipatory developments in large parts of Europe and
the USA to empower various groups within society, e.g.
women, homosexuals, and also patients. This political
tendency meant that choice of provider gained import-
ance as something patients valued [8,17]. During the late
1980s, the instrumental use of patient choice gained im-
portance. This occurred as part of a government plan to
reform the Dutch health insurance system into a system
in which regulated competition between healthcare pro-
viders and insurers is key: it was assumed to be a way toTable 1 Key elements of the health insurance schemes in the
system
Old system
Social health insurance (ZFW) Alte
(PHI
Insured people People under a certain income ceiling
(two-thirds of the population)
Peo
ceili
Mandatory/voluntary Mandatory primary healthcare package and
voluntary additional healthcare package
Volu










Insurer choice Those insured could change insurer and
additional insurance product yearly,
but in practice choice options were limited
Tho
and
Provider choice Free choice among contracted providers Free
mayguarantee the efficiency, quality and accessibility of
healthcare [2,8,18,19]. All these developments together
resulted in plans for a healthcare system in which pa-
tient choice is important, both in its own right and as a
precondition for competition between providers.
Regulated competition was implemented in the
Netherlands in 2006 and resembles the ‘managed com-
petition’ model described by Enthoven [20]. The change
was mainly supported by two acts: the Health Insurance
Act (Zvw) and the Act on Market Regulation in Health-
care (Wmg). Before the change, patients, healthcare
providers and insurers were in a triangular relationship
and the Dutch government regulated the supply and
costs of healthcare and the relationships between the
three parties. People were insured through two very dif-
ferent health insurance schemes, i.e. a social health in-
surance scheme (ZFW) and an alternative private health
insurance scheme (PHI) (Table 1) [21,22]. The changes
introduced three interdependent markets in healthcare
in which the three different parties (i.e. providers,
insurers and consumers) were assigned new roles
(Figure 1) [23]. The first market is the healthcare provision
market, where well-informed patients were assigned the re-
sponsibility to ‘vote with their feet’ by selecting the health-
care providers they preferred [23-25]. The second market
is the healthcare purchasing market, where healthcare
providers offering a high value-for-money ratio are
contracted by insurers. The third market is the healthcare
insurance market. In this market, well-informed consu-
mers have to choose between health insurers and insur-
ance products [19,23]. Only a single health insurance
scheme exists for the whole population, but peopleold insurance system compared with the new insurance
New system
rnative private health insurance
)
Private social health insurance
ple above a certain income
ng (one-third of the population)
The whole population
ntary Mandatory primary healthcare
package and voluntary additional
healthcare package
endent on the risk profile of the
on requesting the insurance
Income-dependent (50%)
and community rating (50%)
efits in cash Insurers are allowed to offer both
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se insured could change insurer
insurance product yearly
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insurer and additional insurance
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choice among all providers, but
receive only partial reimbursement
Free choice among all providers,









Health care provision market 
Figure 1 The healthcare market.
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and benefits in cash (Table 1). The principle of ‘voting
with your feet’ also applies in this market. Patients are
assumed to choose selectively between health insurers
based on e.g. the range of providers contracted and the
insurers’ quality of service. This is assumed to encourage
insurers to compete for consumers by contracting care
providers that offer good value for money. Instead of
regulating the supply of healthcare, the government cre-
ates a level playing field in which market forces can play
a role [19].
Research focus
It is interesting to investigate whether promoting patient
choice of healthcare providers has had its desired effects.
The first step is to make explicit what the underlying
assumptions are about how patient choice is meant to
work and what impact it is expected to have. These
assumptions need to be understood first, because they
determine the indicators needed to evaluate the effect-
iveness of the policy. In the current study, we will model
the assumptions underlying the health insurance system
changes, focusing on the role of patients’ choice of pro-
viders. In this process, we will answer the following
questions:
▪ What did policy makers aim to accomplish by
promoting patient choice of providers?
▪ What determinants were assumed to influence
patient choice of providers?
▪ How did policy makers assume more patient choice
could be promoted?
▪ What possible side-effects of the promotion of
patient choice were discussed?
Although there are several scientific papers that de-
scribe the assumptions underlying the promotion of pa-
tient choice in various countries, e.g. [8,14-16,26], as far
as we know, only a few aimed to model policy assump-
tions by analysing policy documents in combination with
interviews with key figures, e.g. [26]. Even fewer tried tomodel patient choice in the Netherlands using this
method. The current paper therefore expands the body
of literature about public policy evaluation, adds to exist-
ing knowledge about regulated competition in health-
care, and will enable future research on the validity of
this policy.
Method
Modelling the policy assumptions
Various methods are described in the literature for
modelling the assumptions underlying public policy and
how they are interrelated [27,28]. In general, these meth-
ods assume that such a model consists of the following
three parts, which correspond to the research questions:
▪ The problem/goals: which problems does the policy
aim to solve?
▪ Causal assumptions in the form of if-then-
propositions: if a certain condition is true or a certain
component of the policy is implemented, then the
following consequence is assumed.
▪ Final assumptions in the form of if-then-propositions:
if a certain goal is to be accomplished, then this step
has to be taken.
Data collection
In order to model the assumptions of the key policy
makers and their interrelations, we followed the
‘policy-scientific approach’ described by Leeuw [28].
Additionally, we modelled the possible side-effects of
the promotion of patient choice that were discussed.
The method described by Leeuw [28] relies on an ana-
lysis of policy documents and interviews with key policy
makers. In accordance with this approach, expressions
from key policy makers about the concept ‘patient
choice’ were first extracted from a variety of documents
(Appendix A). All the documents consulted are direct
products of the ministry of Health and were published
between 2004 and 2007, because the Wmg and Zvw
were developed during this period. In all, 62 documents
were consulted. Program texts of the instruments
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to gain a deeper understanding of the goals of these
instruments. The sources that we used for the analysis
and that we refer to in the text are shown in the
References [29-86].
In addition to the analysis of the policy documents,
the model that resulted from this analysis was shown
to seven people who were either involved in the de-
velopment of the current health insurance system or
whose professional position enabled them to follow
this development closely (Appendix A). All were
asked whether our model (i.e. Figure 2 and Table 2)
was plausible and whether we had missed out any
assumptions.
Analysis
The problems, goals, causal and final assumptions and
side-effects were extracted from the assembled expres-
sions. All assumptions were reformulated in the form of
propositions and these propositions were used to con-
struct a model. Assumptions and instruments thatFigure 2 Reconstruction of the causal propositions.overlapped were combined and side issues were
excluded. All the authors together discussed the
resulting model. Disagreements were discussed until con-
sensus was reached.
The interviews were transcribed and sent to the inter-
viewees for correction and approval. Where necessary,
adjustments were made to our model with the informa-
tion from the approved documents.
Ethical considerations
Our research complied with the Helsinki Declaration
where applicable. According to the Dutch ‘Medical Re-
search involving human subjects Act’, our study did not
require ethical approval from a medical ethics commit-
tee [87]. Verbal informed consent was obtained from all
interviewees, who were informed of their right to with-
draw from the study at any time they wished without
penalty. All the interviews were voice recorded with the
permission of the interviewees, and the resulting recor-
dings and transcripts were kept confidential. Additionally,
we asked the interviewees to correct and approve the
Table 2 Reconstruction of the final propositions
Legal instruments Condition Communicative instruments Condition Financial instruments Condition
Insurers may choose the policy forms
they offer [45]
F Media campaign from the government






Patients have the right to







With a payment-in-kind policy,
providers are obliged to deliver
care as agreed within a reasonable
time and at a reasonable distance [76]
F Developing comparative information,
e.g. for kiesbeter.nl or the Healthcare
Inspectorate (IGZ) [31,49,57,77-79]
I
With a payment-in-kind policy or a
preferred provider policy, patients
have the right to receive compensation
when they choose a non-contracted
provider in the Netherlands
and in Europe [50]
F Comparative information, e.g. kiesbeter.nl,
physical desks, telephone, papers,
healthcare providers, insurers and




With a reimbursement policy or a
personal budget, patients are allowed
to choose their preferred provider
freely without intervention from the
insurer [42]
F Advice and support for people who are
unable to choose independently
(e.g. by MEE) [56,74,82]
I
Providers are obliged to publish
comparative information [53]
I
Providers are obliged to make the
information understandable,
effective and correct [54]
I
The information providers provide
may not be misleading and must
comply with the legislation [55]
I
W = willing/able to choose; F = freedom of choice; I = Informed.
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those transcripts that were approved were used in our
study. We removed all personal identification information
in this paper.
Results
The political and policy problems/goals
The Dutch government reformed the health insurance
system and promoted patient choice. If patient choice is
part of the solution, what then were the problems in the
‘old’ Dutch health insurance system? The explanatory
memorandums accompanying the two laws that sup-
ported the system change – the Zvw [29] and the Wmg
[30] – mention a variety of problems in the ‘old’ Dutch
health insurance system.
Promoting patient choice was expected to solve two
important political problems. Firstly, the Dutch health-
care system was centralised or state-oriented, i.e. the
Dutch government regulated the supply of healthcare in-
stead of entrusting it to the patients and healthcare
insurers and providers. Consequently, there were no op-
portunities or reasons for the three different parties to
affect each other’s practices and results. Healthcare was
therefore unresponsive to patients, innovation and
flexibility were curtailed, there was no incentive forproviders to improve their quality and efficiency, etcetera.
Secondly, the asymmetrical, paternalistic patient-doctor
relationship urged patients to leave decisions about their
care to their doctors.
The first problem above was expected to be solved by
the introduction of ‘regulated competition’ in healthcare,
which was intended to replace the governmental regula-
tion of supply. Patient choice was promoted as one
element of regulated competition. The promotion of pa-
tient choice can therefore be considered as an instru-
ment to achieve the goal of ‘regulated competition in
healthcare’. Regulated competition, in turn, was consi-
dered to be an instrument for achieving higher-level
goals, e.g. more efficient (including cost control) and
more accessible healthcare of higher quality. The fact
that patient choice was also promoted to solve the
second problem shows that it was considered as a goal
in itself as well, i.e. it was assumed to strengthen the au-
tonomy of patients. The interviewees also stressed the
fact that the concept of ‘patient choice’ is both an in-
strument to improve the quality, efficiency and accessi-
bility of care on a macro level and a goal in its own
right, in other words a goal in itself. Enabling choice of
providers makes it easier for patients to match care to
their preferences [33-36].
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solution to the political problems, several policy pro-
blems were encountered while trying to promote it, e.g.:
▪ patients do not have enough choice options;
▪ patients do not have the freedom to make choices
between providers and insurers;
▪ patients are insufficiently aware of their rights;
▪ there is no standardised method to measure the
quality of the healthcare providers and providers may
fail to provide this information;
▪ there is no level playing field in which insurers,
providers and patients can play their roles.
To solve the policy problems and, in the end, to en-
courage patient choice and introduce regulated competi-
tion, the Zvw and - as the cornerstone of regulated
competition - the Wmg were developed [30-32].
The causal propositions
How can patient choice help to introduce competition
and, in the end, achieve the higher-level goals (e.g. more
efficient and more accessible healthcare of higher qual-
ity)? There are a number of assumptions about patient
choice as a mechanism for quality improvement and
cost containment. For instance, the government assumes
that patients are willing to fit their care to their needs
and are critical about certain characteristics of health-
care providers, such as the costs, quality and waiting
times. Based on information about these characteristics,
patients choose a provider rationally. When dissatisfied,
they ‘vote with their feet’ by switching to a provider that
fits their preferences better. This behaviour tells provi-
ders about patients’ levels of satisfaction with them and
(because they want to obtain or keep patients as their
clients) prompts them to match the care on offer to the
wishes of patients [29-31,37-41].
Figure 2 shows the causal propositions that are part of
the model and how they are interrelated. The interviews
did not result in major changes, since the model was
deemed plausible. However, the interviewees did not
agree with each other on whether patients were assumed
to pay attention to the costs of healthcare providers
(Box 3) and whether patients’ cost awareness was heigh-
tened partly in order to make them focus on the costs of
providers when choosing between them (Box 6). We will
discuss this apparent ambiguity below.
To briefly summarise Figure 2, the policy goal we are
concerned about is patient choice (Box 1). Various
conditions are assumed to lead to patient choice
(Boxes 2–5). A range of factors and instruments influ-
ence whether the conditions are satisfied (Boxes 6–16).
Some have to do with the transparency of healthcare
and lead to well-informed patients (Boxes 6–11).Others have to do with the healthcare insurer and/or
insurance (Boxes 12 to 16). The majority of these fac-
tors influence the degree to which patients are free to
choose a healthcare provider. The last box (17) repre-
sents the media campaign set up by government to
make people aware of the possibilities of choice in
healthcare [37,42-44].
The final propositions
The Dutch government made various final assumptions.
Patient choice is a goal in itself, but is also needed to
introduce competition and to help achieve other public
goals, e.g. ‘improving and safeguarding the quality, effi-
ciency and accessibility of healthcare’ and ‘controlling
the development of costs in healthcare’ [30,32]. In order
to enable patients to choose a provider critically and ac-
tively, the four conditions should be satisfied (Boxes 2 to
5 in Figure 2). Figure 2 and Table 2 show the instru-
ments that needed to be implemented in order to fulfil
the conditions [29]. We divided the instruments into
legal, communicative and financial instruments, which is
a widely recognised division in the literature [27]. We
did not investigate the ‘sufficient supply’ condition any
further in this paper, because we intended to focus on
instruments directed at the patient, but it is assumed to
be an essential condition for choice and the government
implemented several instruments to satisfy this condi-
tion [29]. It should also be noted that while the govern-
ment deemed patient choice a goal in itself, they mainly
focused on patient choice within the context of regu-
lated competition. Although patient choice already was a
goal in itself, all the instruments for patient choice were
only implemented when patient choice became a part of
regulated competition. Maybe because policy makers fo-
cused mainly on patient choice as an instrument, they
did not implement any instruments to satisfy the condi-
tion of being ‘willing and able to choose’. They assumed
that patients were indeed willing to make active choices
in order to receive high-quality care [37]. Again, we
checked the plausibility of our model with the intervie-
wees. This did not result in any major changes.
Almost all the instruments affecting the ‘freedom of
choice’ condition have to do with the healthcare insurer
and/or insurance. Insurers are free to offer any policy
form and patients are free to choose between the avail-
able policy forms [45]. The most important difference in
policy forms is between those based on direct payment
(payment in kind) and those based on restitution. The
former guarantee the insured person access to health-
care providers from a list of providers contracted by the
health insurer. The latter guarantee the insured person
reimbursement of costs incurred. In practice, this im-
plies a free choice of provider, but those insured may
receive only partial reimbursement of the healthcare
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thus determined by the type of policy they have
[29,37,40-42,46-48]. Even so, under the payment-in-kind
scheme, the insured persons are legally allowed to
choose non-contracted providers (but they may poten-
tially receive only partial reimbursement of costs) and,
in the case of a payment-in-kind policy, insurers have to
contract enough providers because they are obliged to
deliver care within a reasonable time and at a reasonable
distance [29,37,40-43,46,48-52]. A media campaign was
set up by government to make the public aware of the
possibilities of choice in healthcare [37,42-44].
The instruments affecting whether patients are
informed all have to do with ‘transparency’, which refers
to the availability of comparative information about the
costs and performance in terms of effectiveness, safety
and patients’ experiences with healthcare providers [23],
[30,31]. Providers are obliged to publish understandable,
effective and correct comparative information about
quality and costs that is not misleading and does not
undermine health legislation [30,38,41,46,53-55]. Be-
cause patients have different information preferences
and a number of parties have developed various quality
or performance indicators and comparative information,
a plethora of information for patients has been produced
[31,35]. Patients can consult the information, e.g. on
websites of user organisations, providers and insurers
and in newspapers. Additionally, to provide a single
general portal that patients can consult, the government
financed the creation of the well-promoted website
‘kiesbeter.nl’ (‘choose better’). People without Internet
access were assumed to request information by phone
or at physical desks or to request help from healthcare
providers, insurers and user organisations [30,31,37-39,
41-44,46,48,56-62]. Besides making comparative infor-
mation available, people’s cost awareness was assumed
to be heightened and they were made partly responsible
for the costs they incur through financial incentives, e.g.
they receive cheques, have to make co-payments and
pay policy excesses and have no-risk benefits. This way,
their critical attitude towards the costs of healthcare
would be influenced positively and, consequently, they
would be motivated to demand care only when they
really need it [29,37,39,40,43,49,63,64].
Side-effects of the policy
Several side-effects of the policy on the promotion of pa-
tient choice of healthcare providers are mentioned in
the policy documents. For instance, policy makers
assumed that not every patient has Internet access or is
able to search the Internet, assess the various alternative
providers and make an informed decision. This may lead
to inequalities in the accessibility of the comparative in-
formation as well as in patients’ ability to choose.Because many patients eventually will not choose, the
competitive pressure will be diminished [37,65,66]. All
these side-effects are listed in Table 3.
Ambiguous aspects
Although the interviewees perceived our model as plaus-
ible, they did not agree on issues concerning the context
of our model, e.g. the definition of patient choice and its
relative importance in the new health insurance system.
We therefore reached the conclusion that some aspects
of the policy are ambiguous. Firstly, patient choice as
postulated in the policy documents refers to individual
patients matching their care to their needs by actively
choosing providers [37]. However, according to some
interviewees, the concept of ‘patient choice’ refers to the
indirect or collective influence of patients on providers
as well: they merely make healthcare providers aware of
the fact that patients are not dependent on them any-
more, even though not all patients eventually choose
[34,67]. However, in both views, patients who (may)
change provider in order to improve the care they re-
ceive are expected to improve healthcare at the macro
level [34,68].
Concerning the use of patient choice as an instrument
or precondition, the policy documents were unclear
about whether patients were expected to take costs into
account when choosing a healthcare provider. The inter-
viewees also did not agree on this matter. We kept costs
in our model, but with the idea that (with payment-in-
kind policies and preferred provider policies) patients
may be expected only to be aware of the costs of health-
care (to prevent excessive care use) and to place the re-
sponsibility of keeping an eye on the costs of the
individual providers on the insurer.
Finally, the ‘freedom of choice’ condition is ambiguous.
When insurers only contract a limited number of health-
care providers, patients’ preferred alternatives may not
be available anymore. Therefore, in our reconstruction,
payment in kind policies or preferred provider policies
have a negative influence on the freedom of choice.
However, there is no consensus about how the govern-
ment defines freedom of choice, i.e. as the availability of
the preferred alternative or the quality of the available
alternatives and clarity about this quality [33-35,68]. In
our model, we adopted the first meaning, because it is
often stated that a reimbursement policy increases the
freedom of choice [36]. Although insurers might be bet-
ter able to negotiate with insurers than individual
patients, the freedom of choice of healthcare providers is
assumed to be important for patients.
Discussion
Patient choice of healthcare providers is an important
theme, not only in the Netherlands but in the UK and
Table 3 The side-effects of the policy regarding the enhancement of patient choice of healthcare providers that are




Some patients are not willing or able to
travel or choose.
There may not be enough competitive pressure [41,51].
There is an urgent situation. Patients do not have time to search providers [56].
Sufficient choice Healthcare providers and insurers enlarge
(especially high quality-providers) or merge.
Additionally, the plethora of rules implemented
to regulate the market will lead to diminished
entrepreneurial activity.
Patients do not have sufficient choice options [41,83]
and costs will increase [84,85]. Consequently,
there may not be enough competitive pressure [41,51].
Patients have too many choice options. Patients may delay choice [84].
Transparency – quality The comparative information that is to be
developed will be opaque, excessive,
incomprehensible, not comparable,
scattered and the various healthcare
providers often are disparate.
Patients are unable to assess the quality of the providers
and consequently cannot be critical about quality,
are unwilling to pay for quality and focus on price
information instead [41,65,86]. Consequently, there
will not be enough competitive pressure [38].
Not every patient has Internet access or is
able to search the Internet, assess the different
options and make an informed decision.
Inequalities exist in the accessibility of the comparative
information and ability to choose. Consequently,
many patients will not choose and the competitive
pressure will be diminished [37,65,66].
Healthcare providers have to deliver a
large amount of data.
Transparency is hindered [86].
The bureaucracy of the system leads to
possibilities for data to be manipulated.
Providers show strategic behaviour and commit fraud [83].
Patients choose based solely on information
about quality.
The relationship of mutual trust between
patient and doctor is being undermined [83].
Transparency - costs Patients do not get to see their healthcare
costs, only have to pay a small premium.
Patients are often unaware of the costs that they incurred,
which limits their cost awareness. This might diminish
the influence of the financial incentives to avoid
excessive care use [40,83,84].
Freedom of choice Insurers contract a limited number of providers. Patients will not have freedom of choice [36,40,41].
Only the ‘rich’ are able to choose a policy
which offers them free choice.
Inequalities exist in the freedom of choice patients have [40,85].
Insurers do not buy high-cost care in order to
fend off high-risk insured parties.
Inequalities exist in the choices people have [37].
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promoting patient choice of healthcare providers has its
desired effects, it must be clear exactly which effects are
desired. For that reason, we modelled the assumptions
underlying the promotion of patient choice of health-
care providers by analysing policy documents and
interviewing key figures. We focused our analysis on
the Netherlands. However, because much the same
assumptions are made by policy makers in the other
northern European countries as well [14,15,26], our
analysis is also interesting for policy makers and
researchers in those countries.
In the current paper, we answered four research ques-
tions. The first research question concerned the reasons
for promoting patient choice. Patient choice of health-
care providers is one important element in a much
broader system in which regulated competition between
providers and insurers is key to controlling the develop-
ment of costs and improving and safeguarding the qual-
ity, efficiency and accessibility of healthcare [31,32].Within the context of regulated competition, patients
are expected to behave as rational actors. This line of
reasoning originates from the classical economic theory
[20,68]. In addition, patient choice was deemed a ‘value’
or a goal in itself. However, in practice, the Dutch
government did not really concern itself with this latter
goal [37,88]. Because it was assumed that patients value
choice, no instruments were implemented to encourage
patients to choose. Even so, literature indicates that a
number of patient groups are in reality less inclined or
able to choose actively, which may affect the equity of
outcomes from patient choice policies [8,12].
The second research question concerned the determi-
nants that were assumed to influence patient choice. It
was assumed that satisfying several conditions leads
patients to choose a provider rationally. Those condi-
tions are that patients are willing to choose and willing
and able to travel and switch provider, that patients are
informed, that there are sufficient healthcare providers
to choose from and that patients are free to choose their
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tion, i.e. how policy makers were to promote patient
choice, the Dutch government and other parties imple-
mented a variety of instruments to satisfy the conditions,
thus creating a level playing field in which market forces
could come into play. This resulted in a health insurance
system that relies heavily on laws to regulate the market
[68]. In our analysis, we did not include the supervisors
of the healthcare market such as the Dutch Health Care
Authority (NZa), because we wanted to focus on instru-
ments directed at the patient. These supervisory bodies
were, however, considered essential for markets to
develop.
Concerning the fourth research question about the
side-effects of the policy, several possible side-effects
are documented in the policy documents. If these side-
effects exist, diminished competitive pressure and a
healthcare provision market that is not really working
without governmental intervention may result. It is
however striking that no discussion was documented
about the role of equality, neither as a possible negative
side-effect of patient choice nor as part of the argument
for patient choice. In the UK, for instance, fairness/
equality was part of the case made for patient choice.
In several other countries, such as the Nordic countries,
there was some concern about the likelihood that intro-
ducing choice would result in adjustment of the health-
care system in favour of certain patient groups (e.g.
healthy, more highly educated, young people). Other
types of patients would be ignored by the providers [8].
The fact that Dutch policy makers had no concerns
about equity is especially interesting because they did
expect differences in choice behaviour between different
patient groups [31].
Because policy making is not a straightforward
process, some aspects of the policy are ambiguous [89].
These ambiguities can have a variety of causes. Secondly,
policy on the health insurance system change was not
strictly defined; instead, some choices were left open
[68]. One example is that the minister of VWS was un-
willing to make a choice between insurance policy types
and was ready to let ‘all the players on the market’ de-
cide on the matter [36]. Thirdly, in policy documents,
assumptions are made and words are used for concepts
that cannot be grasped merely by reading written mate-
rial about the subject [34]. For example, patient choice is
a concept that refers to the indirect influence patients
(the demand side) have on healthcare providers, but it is
never explicitly defined as such. Fourthly, there might
not be one single way to understand the policy; instead,
words and assumptions that are used in it might have
different meanings for different people. For some policy
makers, patient choice refers to individual patients ac-
tively choosing a healthcare provider, while for othersthe concept refers to the threat of competitors that
patients might choose. Finally, the development of the
policy on health insurance system change has been a
political process during which compromises had to be
negotiated, for example regarding which goal of patient
choice is the main focus. There are also other coun-
tries, in which patient choice has multiple goals, such
as Scandinavia and the UK [2,8,10,11]. However, the
Netherlands is unique, since patient choice as a goal
in its own right conflicts with letting insurers con-
tract providers in selectively. Whereas the latter is es-
sential for the functioning of the new health insurance
system and regulated competition [18], the former was
also included in the policy as a goal in its own right [69].Healthcare provision and the insurance market
Although the current study focuses on the choice of
providers, the healthcare insurance and provision mar-
kets are interrelated. However, the policy makers
involved in the development of the current health insur-
ance system tried to make sure that patients will always
have a free choice of provider, independently of their in-
surance products (there may be some financial conse-
quences). This makes it valid to analyse the healthcare
provision market separately from the healthcare insur-
ance market in the Dutch situation.Limitations, strengths and follow-up research
One limitation of this study is that we confined our
analysis mainly to policy documents about the Wmg
and the Zvw. This meant that we did not incorporate
the history of the health insurance system changes.
We partially solved this issue by consulting additional
literature in order to put our reconstruction into con-
text. Furthermore, we did not have the opportunity to
interview the person who was the Minister of Health
during the years that the health insurance system
acquired its final form. A strong point of this research
is, however, that we held interviews both with key
figures involved in the health insurance system change
and with people who followed this development
closely.
Another strength of this paper is that, as far as we
know, few scientific papers have been written either in
the Netherlands or abroad that aimed to model the
policy assumptions underlying the promotion of patient
choice by combining policy document analysis with
interviews with key figures. The current paper therefore
expands the body of literature about public policy evalu-
ation, adds to the existing knowledge about regulated
competition in healthcare, and will enable future re-
search on the validity of this policy, e.g. whether patients
are indeed willing to choose their provider.
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Patient choice of healthcare providers is both a goal in
its own right and a fundamental element in a system in
which regulated competition between providers is key.
Several instruments have been put in place to ensure
that patients can act as consumers on the healthcare
market: making sure that they are well-informed and
that the insurance system poses no barriers. There has
been much less attention for the willingness and ability
of patients to choose, i.e. choice as a ‘value’. Also, the
consequences on equity of outcomes if several patient
groups are less inclined or capable to choose actively
received little attention.Appendix A. Data collection
Document search
The database ‘overheid.nl’ was searched for policy
documents from the Dutch House of Representatives
and the Dutch Senate concerning the Zvw, Wmg and
policy on patients/consumers. This database contains
all policy documents, policy letters and minutes of
meetings of the Dutch House of Representatives and
the Dutch Senate. The three searches consisted of the
search strings ‘zorgverzekeringswet’, ‘marktordening
gezondheidszorg’ and ‘patiënten/consumentenbeleid’. The
searches were restricted to meeting minutes and official
papers from the years 2004 to 2006, because the Wmg
and Zvw were developed during this period. The 344
documents we initially found were reviewed on title to
determine whether they concerned patient choice for
healthcare providers. 58 documents met this criterion.
Additionally, we analysed the political agendas of the
Dutch Ministry of Health from the years 2004, 2005
and 2006 and a document from the Dutch Health
Care Authority (NZa).Interviews
Seven people occupying the following functions during
the years in which the system acquired its final form
were interviewed: two policy makers working for the
Ministry of Health involved in the reform of the Dutch
healthcare system, a professor of the policy and organ-
isation of mental healthcare in the Netherlands working
for the institute of Health Policy & Management (iBMG)
who advised the Dutch government about the new
healthcare system, a professor of healthcare policy ana-
lysis at Maastricht University; the president of the Fede-
ration of Patients and Consumer Organisations in the
Netherlands (NPCF), the president of the association of
Dutch health insurers (Zorgverzekeraars Nederland
(ZN)) and the chairman of the Council for Public Health
and Health Care (RVZ).Competing interests
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